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Abstract
Refugee participation in transnational acts – from advo-
cating for regime change in home countries to strengthen-
ing modes of safe passage for friends and family to host
countries – is only as effective as the ability of refugees to
organize, collaborate with one another, and develop
strong communication links between communities in the
home and host countries. While many assume that legal
status improves the ability of refugees to engage in politi-
cal transformation, research on the Burmese refugees liv-
ing in Japan reveals that the application and provision of
legal status can have the opposite effect, weakening fragile
community structures, stemming advocacy efforts, and
discouraging communication between divided political
and ethnic groups. I argue that transnational acts form a
three-way relationship with legal recognition and local
community, and that, because of conflictual relationships
among local refugee communities, refugees from Burma
with higher degrees of legal recognition in Japan do not
necessarily expand transnational space.
Résumé
La participation des réfugiés aux lois transnationales –
depuis leur plaidoyer en faveur d’un changement de ré-
gime dans les pays d’origine au renforcement des modes
de passage sécuritaire pour les amis et la famille vers les
pays hôtes – est aussi efficace que leur capacité à organi-
ser, à collaborer entre eux et à établir des liens étroits de
communication entre les pays d’origine et d’accueil. Bien
qu’il soit admis que la situation juridique améliore la ca-
pacité des réfugiés à envisager une transformation politi-
que, des recherches menées auprès des réfugiés birmans
qui résident au Japon révèlent que l’application et la dis-
position de la situation juridique peut avoir l’effet inverse
et fragiliser les structures communautaires, interrompre
les tentatives de plaidoyer et décourager la communica-
tion entre les groupes politiques et ethniques déjà divisés.
L’article défend la thèse que les lois transnationales for-
ment une relation à trois avec la reconnaissance juridi-
que et la communauté locale et que, à cause de relations
conflictuelles parmi les communautés locales de réfugiés,
les réfugiés de Birmanie dotés d’un fort taux de recon-
naissance juridique au Japon n’élargissent pas nécessaire-
ment l’espace transnational.
R
efugees who have fled protracted conflict find vari-
ous means of advocating for change in their coun-
tries of origin. They assemble to discuss the political
and economic situation in their region of origin, they share
news and dismiss rumours through social networks, they
distribute information through media outlets and nongov-
ernmental  organizations (NGOs), and  they  demonstrate
and organize protests in order to call attention to the condi-
tions in their home country.
These acts of communication and coordination not only
cross borders, but in generating  new  strategies and  re-
sources to mobilize internal and exiled populations, they
transcend them. Such political actions take place “over and
beyond” the borders of home and host countries, and thus
lie in the transnational realm.1
Refugees have varying degrees of legal recognition in
their host country, ranging from official “refugee” status to
temporary status to special residence permits to entirely
illegal. Regardless of the specific terminology of each coun-
try, it is believed that the possession of legal status expands
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transnational political space.2 That is, there is an underlying
assumption that migrants and refugees with legal recogni-
tion are better able, and more likely, to engage in political
advocacy than those who are illegal.
In studying the particularities of the Burmese refugee
community in Japan, this paper challenges that unidirec-
tional assumption  and complicates the relationship be-
tween legal status and transnationalism. Rather,
transnational acts are part of a three-way relationship in-
cluding legal recognition and local community. The devel-
opment and maintenance of local refugee communities in
Japan influence and are influenced by both legal status and
transnational political acts, often in surprising ways. De-
spite the fact that legal recognition is thought to provide
greater  freedom of expression and movement and thus
more opportunities to engage in advocacy efforts, in the
Burmese refugee community in Japan, conflict arises from
the application and provision of legal status, and transna-
tional space is often diminished as a result.
I begin the paper by considering the transnational compo-
nents and nature of refugee advocacy movements. Next,
drawing from the literatures on transnationalism and dias-
pora, I describe the elements of the three-way relationship
between transnational acts, legal status, and local commu-
nity. Two months of field research in Japan – documentation,
direct observation, and interviews – illuminate the remaining
sections. First, I review the legal and factual circumstances
surrounding the Burmese refugees in Japan. Second, I map
the Burmese refugee community by ethnicity and political
groups, comparing those with and without legal status. I
conclude by specifying the connections between transnation-
alism, legal recognition, and local community.
Transnational Actors
Transnationalism is neither the unique domain of individu-
als nor of networks created by individuals. The ability of
corporations, NGOs, liberation movements, cultural
groups, and other non-state actors to partake in transna-
tional acts has been noted by many.3 In the migration litera-
ture, however, transnational action has moved to the
forefront, as authors appropriately focus on the ways in
which migrants and refugees are able to use transnational
space in order to promote their agendas or agitate against
undesirable policies.
Particularly, there is a value in understanding how refu-
gees engage in transnational acts, and how they are able to
define and refine their identities beyond the restrictive
boundaries of a hostile home country and an (often) un-
welcoming host country. Political action is particularly
meaningful for refugees who have presumably fled from a
government of persecution and discrimination. This paper,
then, focuses on the specifics of refugee transnationalism in
its political form.4
Transnational Action (and Emotion)
The topic of transnationalism has been bandied around just
long enough that it is perhaps no longer accurate to call it a
vogue topic (although it is certainly not yet retro). The field’s
numerous commentators draw from, among other disci-
plines, anthropology, cultural studies, political science, so-
ciology, and migration.5 Nevertheless, the discourse on
transnationalism continues to play a salient role in the lit-
erature, reflecting its substantial significance in reality.
Transnationalism in all its forms – from developing
transborder social networks to strengthening modes of safe
passage to host countries to sending remittances home – is
indeed a relevant phenomenon. Technological advances
have facilitated the transfer of information and money, and
superior methods of transportation have eased the ability
of migrants and refugees to move physically from one
country to another.6
Specifically, transnational political action utilizes these
exchanges in order to effect political change in the home
country, and transnational space is the arena in which these
efforts are made.7 Adamson lists three ways political entre-
preneurs advocate for changes at home: (1) using exiled
voices to challenge the discourse of the home country; (2)
raising international awareness through local NGOs and
state actors; and (3) sending resources to local actors in the
home country.8
Van Hear has identified “movements or exchanges of
people, money, and information” as the building blocks of
transnational action.9 However, while individuals hope to
accomplish concrete political action, the nature of their
exchanges need not be concrete; Van Hear’s three funda-
mental items can be supplemented by less tangible, but
equally important, elements. In addition to the movement
of people, money, and information, transnational space
allows for the exchange of questions, ideas, strategies, and
decisions. This differentiation is necessary because infor-
mation is traded; ideas are created. Transnational ties, true
to their meaning, transcend a simple international ex-
change of “things” in order to produce knowledge, aware-
ness, and a sense of identity. Likewise, ignorance,
indifference, and alienation can occupy transnational space
as well.
As the examination of community and its relationship to
transnationalism will show further on, sentiment and sensa-
tion also move through transnational lines: trust (and dis-
trust), conviction (and doubt), and hope  (and despair).
Because transnationalism is intricately linked with the ability
to establish community networks between those “at home”
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and those abroad, the positive and negative emotions that
accompany such relationships are a critical, although, I argue,
underexamined aspect of transnational ties.10
Indeed, ignorance, indifference, alienation, distrust,
doubt, and despair are as likely to exist as elements of tran-
snational space as are their positive counterparts, and this
observation  highlights what  several authors have noted.
Transnational forces are not always positive. Migrants may
be motivated to participate in transnational political net-
works for purely nationalistic purposes or purely egotistical
ones. Prestige and status may drive individuals to transna-
tionalism, as can social pressure, family influence, and guilt.11
Finally, migrants and refugees are capable of using their
cross-continental connections not only to foster peaceful
solutions but to foment violent revolution.12 In studying
this question, academics as well as policy makers are drawn
to ask: “Can (or should) policies be devised which enhance
the positive outcomes of transnational networks, while dis-
couraging transnational activities which fuel or sustain
conflicts?”13 If such policies are possible at all, a better
understanding of the role of legal status in shaping transna-
tional space is necessary.
Legal Status in the Host Country
The literature on refugee law is too vast and digressive to
discuss here. Germane to this examination, however, are two
points: 1) legal status describes only a refugee’s legal label
and cannot be considered an accurate picture of what he
actually is or is not; and 2) legal status has a complicated,
multi-faceted relationship with transnational space.
The Refugee Label
It should be clear that the actual number of refugees in the
world – that is, those who have fled their home countries in
need of protection elsewhere – far exceeds those with official
“refugee” status. The Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), driven by the na-
tion-states which support it and host refugees, has no choice
but to limit the number of individuals on whom it bestows
refugee status. Scarce resources require this.14
Host countries construct the same hazy divisions. With
limited budgets, few countries are willing to provide refugee
legal status to all those who arrive at their borders, and
whether accurate or just or neither, restrictions are put into
place to allow for identifying and selecting “refugees” out
of a larger group. Many host countries shy away from the
term “refugee” altogether and employ different categories
to determine the treatment of those who cross their bor-
ders. This process and the political and domestic factors
that shape immigration/refugee quotas yield uneven re-
sults. “Official” refugee status as deemed by UNHCR or
legal allowances provided by the host country is, at best, a
mediocre indicator of whether or not an individual merits
the “refugee” label.
The determination of legal status highlights the critical
issue of the “migration-asylum nexus,” which points to the
ambiguity in distinguishing between those who cross bor-
ders for economic (migration) or political (asylum) rea-
sons. Many host countries, increasingly unwilling to offer
asylum to refugees, instead prefer to identify them as tem-
porary migrant workers. If, over time, refugees understand
that their chances to remain in the host country will im-
prove if they claim to be migrant workers, the alarming
result is that they will cease applying for asylum. While their
status as migrant workers ensures them short-term resi-
dence in host countries, it avoids the issue of protection.
Unlike migrant labourers, refugees have no foreign body to
represent them.15
Legal Status and Transnationalism
It some ways, the positive relationship between legal status
and transnational space seems clear and evident. Many
scholars have argued that legal status paves the way for
transnational space.16 With greater freedoms in the host
country afforded by legal recognition, refugees can engage
in a host of transnational political acts, such as demonstrat-
ing without fear of arrest.17 Transnational space is also fa-
cilitated by place. That is, those who have a place to meet
and do not fear assembling to partake in political discussion
are better able to further transnational political goals.18
However, perceptions about the need for evidence to
prove asylum (or other forms of legal status) have em-
broiled questions of legal status and transnationalism. In
explicating asylum policy in the United Kingdom, Shah
underlines the fact that political agitation is often used to
try to establish asylum claims, while these same transna-
tional political acts can reduce the chances of receiving
asylum.19 This critical point reveals that the relationship
between legal status and political advocacy is not solely
positive, and it does not move in only one direction. The
complexity of this relationship will be explored further on,
particularly as it pertains to the Burmese refugees in Japan.
Community Networks vs. Local Communities
Networks that link geographically distant communities play
a crucial role in maintaining and shaping transnational space.
These community networks are an integral mechanism in the
facilitation of transnational action. For example, community
networks generate information about the host country, cir-
culate it throughout the network’s members, and communi-
cate it to potential newcomers.20 Networks provide the
“organizational infrastructure” to convey migrants and refu-
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gees to host countries, often through clandestine channels.21
Finally, community networks between populations in the
home and host countries allow for the coordination of advo-
cacy on specific issues and the distribution of relevant and
timely news concerning the host government in power.
While community networks are an inherent element of
transnational action, local communities play a different role,
and the distinction ought to be made clear. By “local com-
munities," I refer to the population in the host country with
whom the refugee surrounds himself, and the networks she
employs for the purpose of domestic and local concerns. A
refugee’s local community might include family, friends,
employers, and religious compatriots. While local commu-
nities may be transnational, they need not be. Perhaps it is
axiomatic to assert that local communities with greater
transnational connections are more likely to engage in
transnational acts, but this point is precisely the basis for
the third leg of the triad: the composition and quality of a
refugee’s local community is an important and overlooked
factor in the shaping of transnational political space.
For refugees and other migrant groups, local community
is often linked to ethnic identity. Linguistic and cultural
similarities with home populations facilitate trust and com-
munication among individuals who feel alienated in the
host country. Refugees, often members of minority groups
accustomed to relying on one another in the country from
which they have fled, continue to cluster together. Natu-
rally, many countries host refugees of more than one eth-
nicity, and as noted by Ambroso, this transnational identity
is not always inclusive.22 Exiled communities often vie for
the same transnational space in the form of resources, legal
aid, media attention, and prestige, and divisions between
refugees from different local communities frequently fall
along ethnic lines.
The  preceding review indicates that the relationships
between political transnationalism, legal recognition, local
communities, and ethnic identity have not been ignored by
any means. However, where this paper hopes to make an
original contribution is in placing these relationships
within the context of one another. As the following section
will show, Japan’s Burmese refugee population reveals the
ways in which these elements interconnect and influence
one another, often in iterative phases.
For the same reasons that this study might be considered valu-
able and original, it may not be generalizable. First, whether
they fled from the  rural  Arakan state  or the urban  capital
Rangoon, the Burmese refugees in Japan live in the most urban
of all resettlement situations. Unlike many of their compatriots
who crossed borders into Thailand or Bangladesh to live in rural
areas or refugee camps, virtually none of the Burmese in Japan
are living outside of the cities. Urban settings have been noted
to encourage refugees to depend less on outside forces than
rural or camp settings.23 In Japan, the fact that Burmese refu-
gees face relatively similar work opportunities and obstacles,
similar types of housing, and similar initial access to health and
education upon arrival makes the presence (or absence) of local
communities that much more influential.
Second, Japan’s Burmese refugees are plainly situated in
the intermediate term, the nebulous and lengthy period
between the post-emergency phase and the resolution of
the conflict.24 Burmese refugees are engaged in transna-
tional political action in order to, and with the intention to,
return to Burma when the conflict subsides. Kurdish and
Tamil refugee communities are two other examples of refu-
gee situations where the conflict is ongoing, and, as with all
refugees who remain the intermediate term, their sense of
security is less stable and more temporary than that of
refugees who have found a durable solution. Furthermore,
because the conflict is ongoing, it is difficult to measure the
effectiveness of advocacy efforts in the short term.
Third, Japan’s tiny and relatively new Burmese refugee
population does not have the force of a large-scale refugee
movement. Its small size has made it somewhat facile to
study, but it does not possess what we might call “networks
of scale.” That is, as more refugees populate a host commu-
nity for longer periods of time, they gain access to aid, legal
status, and other resources. Increasingly,  they have the
ability to help other refugees and mobilize for demonstra-
tions. Japan’s Burmese refugee population is yet too small
and new for significant impact. Neither do generational
issues present themselves at this time. There are only a
handful of Burmese refugee children past elementary
school age currently in Japan.
However, as the community grows in numbers and dura-
tion of time, refugees will integrate linguistically and eco-
nomically. This fourth and final point is critical: the Burmese
refugee population in Japan is very much in transition. Un-
less there are drastic changes in Burma or in Japanese immi-
gration policy in the next ten years, the refugee population
will not only be better integrated and larger, but will have a
significant second generation of children. It is very likely that
the composition of those with and without legal status will
change as well, although the direction of this change is more
difficult to predict, given Japan’s ever-changing but consis-
tently restrictive immigration policies.
The Burmese Refugees in Japan
Notwithstanding generous per-capita donations to UNHCR,
refugee status is not easily granted in Japan.25 Critics site
Japan’s high degree of ethnic homogeneity and isolation as
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reasons for its restrictive refugee policies.26 Others note the
lack of a historical legal framework for conceptualizing the
notion of a “refugee” altogether.27 In recent years, Japan’s
efforts to become more involved in the international foreign
policy arena have led to some ad hoc attempts to accept more
foreigners and refugees into the country on a temporary
basis, but legal status for refugees continues to be problem-
atic.28 Since 1975, a small number of Indochinese refugees
(approximately ten thousand) have resettled in Japan. As part
of a quota agreement, most were permitted to remain in or
enter the country on a temporary basis. Recently, some have
secured permanent residence, but approximately half possess
only temporary protection in the form of long-term resident
status, which must be renewed every one to three years. Few,
if any, have official refugee status, which implies a tempo-
rariness which belies the circumstances.29 The lack of consis-
tent durable protection proffered by the Ministry of Justice
(MoJ) demonstrates that refugee policy has been a low pri-
ority for the Japanese government.
Because this paper compares those Burmese in Japan
who possess legal status with those who do not, it is clear
that not all of those who have fled Burma have received
official refugee status in Japan. Thus, the term “refugee” is
used loosely here. Because the Japanese government has
recognized very few Burmese (and few asylum seekers of
any nationality, for that matter) as Convention refugees, an
examination of only such refugees would be slim indeed.
Rather, this paper identifies Burmese refugees as those who
claim to have fled Burma for political reasons.30
Until mid-2004, there were an estimated ten thousand
Burmese living in Japan. Most began arriving following the
military junta’s brutal crackdown against democracy dem-
onstrations in 1988, and others have continued to arrive
ever since. Approximately 90 per cent of the ten thousand
were illegal overstayers, individuals who came to  Japan
legally but remained past their legal allowance. The major-
ity arrived with limited work or travel visas, and some
arrived originally on student visas. A small number arrived
by boat, former sailors in the Burmese military who de-
serted their ships and their crew. Others arrived through
third countries such as Korea, the Philippines, or Thailand.
A handful actually claimed refugee status when they arrived
at the border (at airports near Tokyo or Osaka), but to my
knowledge, none were accepted for refugee status immedi-
ately, although none were sent back outright.
In 2004, authorities from the MoJ threatened to reduce
the number of overstayers by 50 per cent, and since then,
employers have been fined for hiring illegal migrants, and
arrests and detention have increased significantly. As a re-
sult, by mid-2005, the number of Burmese who remain in
Japan is estimated to be between five thousand and seven
thousand.
The approximately one thousand Burmese who reside
legally in Japan who are not refugees are either government
officials, businessmen who benefit from the current regime,
or spouses of Japanese citizens, all of whom are reluctant to
challenge the present military junta. While they may engage
in transnational acts as migrants, they certainly could not
be considered refugees under even the most liberal defini-
tion. This group of one thousand is, therefore, outside the
scope of this paper’s research.
The remaining Burmese overstayers in Japan are difficult
to categorize according to motivation. While all are opposed
to the ruling regime, their reasons for coming to Japan may
be purely political or highly economic or anything in be-
tween. Like refugees everywhere fleeing a country in conflict,
many Burmese fled to Japan to avoid the devastating impact
of a failing economy, hoping to save their families not only
from persecution, but from unemployment, malnutrition,
and starvation. These aspirations are often ignored in Japan,
as they are elsewhere. A sharp distinction between political
and economic motivations does not reflect the reality of those
fleeing a failing state. This study focuses on those who live on
the political end of the spectrum, of whom approximately
four hundred have received, applied for, or expressed intent
to apply for refugee status.
Legal and Residence Status in Japan
Citizenship in Japan is notoriously difficult to obtain.31
Individuals of Korean descent whose parents and grandpar-
ents were born in Japan, who speak no other language but
Japanese, have not been granted Japanese citizenship. There
are few, if any, refugees of any nationality who are fully
naturalized Japanese citizens. Additional categories inappli-
cable  to  refugees include  individuals  such  as diplomats,
artists, skilled labourers, spouses and children of citizens,
and students. Notably, these categories, which confer per-
mission to reside in Japan, are separate from legal status. The
continuum below reveals both the legal categories and status
of residence relevant to refugees:
Official refugee status↔ special permission↔ asylum seeker↔ overstayer
Usually granted long-term No residence status
resident status
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Convention refugees, or those with official refugee status
(nanming), are those recognized as such by the Japanese
government. UNHCR’s mandate status alone has certainly
not been sufficient to protect refugees in Japan – early in
2005, two Kurdish asylum seekers with mandate status were
refouled directly to Turkey, much to the shock of the advo-
cacy community in Japan. While no Burmese with mandate
status have been refouled, Japan’s actions are not encourag-
ing. Neither are UNHCR’s. If mandate status was never
entirely effective in protecting asylum seekers in Japan, it
certainly no longer is; since the aforementioned deporta-
tion, UNHCR in Japan has chosen to stop giving mandate
status to asylum seekers altogether.
While the total number of Burmese with official refugee
status is small (approximately 80 from 1992 to 2004), it is
still a significant percentage of the total nanming popula-
tion in Japan, which numbered a total of 320 at the close of
2004. (As discussed earlier, Indochinese refugees were not
given official refugee status and are therefore not included
in this number.) In recent years, this pattern is even more
prominent; in 2004, of the fifteen refugees recognized by
the MoJ as nanming, fourteen were Burmese.
A greater number of Burmese have been able to secure
temporary protection by being granted “special permis-
sion” (zaitoku) to stay in Japan, a category not unique to
refugees, but applicable to all migrants. These Burmese
refugees are also legal and they total approximately 130. At
the start of this research, I attempted to tease out differences
between those with official refugee status and those with
special permission, since they are legally distinct categories,
but for all intents and purposes, their rights and lives are
exactly the same. Both generally receive long-term resi-
dence status (teiju-sha) upon being granted legal recogni-
tion. I have, therefore, placed them in the same category for
the purposes of comparison.
Asylum seekers (nanming nintei shinsei sha) deserve par-
ticular attention. They are pursuing refugee status, but have
neither been accepted nor rejected yet. The great majority
have no legal status when they apply – that is, they are
overstayers, rather than, for example, students who apply for
refugee status while they have legal rights to be in Japan. This
category is important because (1) there are more Burmese
asylum seekers than either those with refugee status or special
permission (approximately 180 at the close of 2004); (2) their
numbers are increasing daily; and (3) applying for status/asy-
lum is a long process, generally lasting from one to three
years. During this time, refugee participation in transnational
activities is as important as before and after.
Given that most asylum seekers are illegal at the time of
their application, they live precariously. Until recently, the
very act of applying for asylum triggered their deportation
procedure, which meant that, technically, they could be
detained and deported while their cases were still under
consideration. Recent revisions to the Immigration Control
and Refugee Recognition Act, which went into effect on
May 16, 2005, have somewhat improved their temporary
security. Now, at the same time that asylum seekers submit
their claims, they are automatically considered for a renew-
able provisional stay permit (karitaizai), which suspends
deportation procedures until after a decision is made on
their legal status. These changes and others in the law have
come about due to the intense efforts of Japanese asylum
lawyers, and, notably, in consultation with Japanese NGOs
and even a Burmese individual with official refugee status.
This is interesting evidence of transnational advocacy that
improves conditions in the host country, rather than in the
home country.32
By far the largest of number of Burmese fall into the
category of overstayer (huko shurosha), but as noted earlier,
there is no easy way to distinguish between those who have
come only for economic reasons and those who have not.
The number of those who would be identified as refugees
under my definition  may range anywhere from several
hundred to several thousand.
From the above continuum, there are three categories
into which refugees can be separated according to trans-
national  activity. These categories provide the  basis  for
comparison for the purposes of this paper:
Illegal overstayer (category 1)↓
Asylum seeker (category 2)
↓
Official refugee status or special permission (category 3)
Transnational Action for the Burmese in Japan
While insignificant networks of scale may limit the transna-
tional impact of the small and relatively new Burmese refu-
gee community in Japan, transnational activities are still a
critical element of life, particularly for those who have ar-
rived recently. Almost all Burmese refugees whom I inter-
viewed came to Japan with the assistance of migrants and/or
refugees who preceded them, and most disclosed that they
have helped others since arriving. Passports are falsified,
apartments are shared, and the names of potential employ-
ers are circulated. Even before leaving Burma, information
about legal procedure in Japan is available. The name of one
prominent refugee lawyer in Tokyo is known in political
circles in Burma’s capital city, Rangoon, a clear indication
that transnational circuits are functioning vigorously.
On the political front, transnational activities take com-
mon and expected forms. Refugees demonstrate in front of
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the Burmese embassy, distribute information about the
military junta to local NGOs, lobby the government to end
official development aid to Burma, write articles in English
and Japanese newspapers, send money to the Thai-Burmese
border, and organize and participate in Burmese cultural
events. The picture of Burma’s most famous dissident, 1991
Nobel Peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, can be found in
many homes, on political circulars, and on the enormous
posters that adorn political protests and cultural gatherings.
Local Community Divisions
Despite common ground in loathing the current regime and
working for change, the refugee community is internally
divided. Burmese refugees belong to a bewildering array of
various political groups with every acronym imaginable, and
deciphering the numerous personal vendettas and political
issues that surround the formation of each group would be
akin to untangling a scouring pad into a line of thread.
Political demonstrations in Tokyo and cultural events in
various locations present a relatively united face to Burma’s
military junta, and this image of cohesion is, of course,
critical. However, when signs come down and ethnic cos-
tumes come off, griping is common.
Some refugees insist that it is impossible to obtain legal
status unless you are a member of a particular political
group. Others counter that increasingly restrictive policies
on the part of the Japanese government have led some
Burmese to abuse the asylum system. Some Burmese ethnic
minorities point out that they are excluded from the most
prominent refugee political groups. Others respond that
hard-line ethnic minority goals (which few espouse, at least
openly) are incompatible with the democracy struggle.
These examples highlight how much tension is generated
in the community by discussions about who “deserves”
refugee status.
In Japan and elsewhere, divisions between Burma’s ma-
jority population and its ethnic minorities are profound.
The majority Burmans desire democratic rule while the
ethnic minorities want various degrees of autonomy and
independence. There lies deep distrust among the groups.
Silverstein traces a longstanding divide-and-rule strategy
that feeds and is fed by a pattern of ethnic rivalry, while
Rajah demonstrates that conflicting interests among the
ethnic groups make such methods successful for the current
regime as well.33 Today, both the lack of open communica-
tion and the varying demands of Burma’s many ethnic
groups – from democracy to autonomy to independence –
complicate the processes of future reconciliation. 34 It is a
sobering reality that even if Burma’s military junta were to
cede power tomorrow, reconciliation is not by any means
assured. This is why positive transnational links are critical.
In Japan specifically,  there are  divisions between the
Burmans and the ethnic minorities (of whom there are ten
groups in Japan: Chin, Kachin, Karen, Lahu, Paluang, Rak-
hine, Shan, Mon, Naga, and Rohingya). The ethnic minor-
ity groups believe that their low numbers of legal status
(with the exception of the Rohingya, discussed below) are
due to the fact that Burmans have been unwilling to allow
the ethnic minorities into leadership in political organiza-
tions in Japan. Because they are not represented in political
groups, the minorities believe, they cannot prove refugee
status. Japanese lawyers have asserted that political leader-
ship positions are not necessary to obtain legal status, but
the perception remains. On their part, many Burmans be-
lieve that ethnic minorities have not protested loudly
enough to qualify as refugees.
Even among the ethnic minorities, the Muslim Ro-
hingyas are patently excluded from community events,
channels of information, job opportunities, and help with
housing. The Rohingya, who number approximately sev-
enty in Japan, have an unusually high rate of legal recogni-
tion (approximately twenty have been accorded refugee
status or special permission, category 3), due to their sig-
nificant ability to prove fear of persecution in Burma. In
essence, the Rohingya provide support within their own
group, and legal status reinforces, rather than weakens,
their very small community. However, the provision of
legal status tends to increase hostility against the Rohingya
as a group (which divides the ethnic minorities further).
The ability of  the  Rohingya to  function  transnationally
requires further study.
Clearly, personal rivalries and ethnicity play a notewor-
thy role in creating rifts among refugees in Japan, but more
relevant and increasingly evident because of restrictive gov-
ernment policies, the application and provision of legal
status  damages local community cohesion.  Rather than
working toward a common goal, refugees now compete
with one another for the scarce resource of legal recogni-
tion. This finding is critical to part of my thesis, which is
that legal recognition does not always expand transnational
space.
Transnationalism clearly plays a role in facilitating infor-
mation that supports daily efforts: one man explained to
me the following chain that brought him to a Japanese
language program: the political group of which he was a
member in Burma recommended the name of a lawyer in
Tokyo, who sent him to UNHCR. UNHCR referred him to
a Japanese refugee NGO, which informed him about the
Japanese agency that provides language programs. This
refugee’s original contact source, from which he received
the information that allowed him to access other resources,
exemplifies transnationalism at work.
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In theory, refugees in category 1, the overstayers, have
the least freedom to move about and protest in public. We
would thus expect that their involvement in political tran-
snationalism would be minimal, while we would expect that
those refugees in category 3 with legal allowance to reside
in Japan would be the most vocal and active. Given the
finding by Shah that asylum seekers have been rejected for
political agitation, we would expect category 2 asylum seek-
ers to keep out of the public sphere as well.35 Because of
refugees’ interactions with their local communities,  the
reality in Japan is far different.
Overstayers (Category 1)
Overstayers in category 1 present a complicated picture be-
cause of the aforementioned difficulty in teasing out motiva-
tion. The majority of overstayers are not involved politically
whatsoever, focusing only on their livelihoods, but this group
does not fall into the refugee category. There are many over-
stayers, however, who are politically active. They have chosen
to remain illegal for a number of reasons. Many have families
in Burma whom they fear would be harmed if they applied
for refugee status. Others eschew the taboo label “refugee.”
This subgroup of overstayers, whom I call category 1, whose
members are illegal but involved politically, do involve them-
selves in some  transnational  activities, such as  attending
political meetings and cultural events, sending money home,
and providing contacts, information, and assistance to new
arrivals. Until recently, they also attended demonstrations
and marches, but a sobering account (circulated transnation-
ally), which occurred in 2004, has impeded this activity: an
overstayer who often protested at the Burmese embassy was
arrested and deported back to Burma, whereupon he was
detained straight from the airport.36 Importantly, because
they have not claimed refugee status, these individuals retain
their Burmese passports. Therefore, they are a key mecha-
nism for bringing money, documents, and packages to and
from Burma.37 Transnational networks ensure that  local
communities in both countries know where, when, and how
to find these one-time transpostal deliverymen.
A curious phenomenon is worth noting. Many overstay-
ers from Burma admitted coming to Japan primarily for
economic reasons. Upon arrival, they heard from the vocal
local community what they never learned in Burma. Stories
of forced  labour, rape, arrest  without due process, and
countless egregious actions by the Burmese military awak-
ened their sense of conscience. While never interested in
protesting in Burma, these overstayers became more politi-
cal than they ever would have been at home.38 Political
transnational space is thus magnified by the presence of a
local community of overstayers, and as the migrant com-
munity continues to grow, so may the number of activists.
Legal Refugees (Category 3)
Category 3 refugees are more comfortable in public spaces,
and thus they are able to practice the permeating Burmese
culture of meeting at tea houses to gossip and discuss sports
and politics. Some are active on the advocacy scene. The
majority, however, are absent from political demonstrations
and minimally involved in efforts toward political transfor-
mation in Burma. They may engage in transnational acts
such as bringing family members from Burma to live with
them in Japan, but their participation in political transna-
tional events is low.39
Why have many category 3 refugees removed themselves
from the political and transnational arenas? First, legal status
has furnished them with the potential to lead a more normal
life – to live with their family members, to secure long-term
jobs, to receive health care, and to take vacations. After years
of living in fear, many legal refugees have refocused their
energies on livelihood, rather than political, activities.
Second, many category 3 refugees in Japan have curtailed
their political activities because they feel unwelcome in the
local communities where they were accustomed to spend-
ing time. Jealousy appears to play a role, and resentment is
present as well. Once they have received legal status, cate-
gory 3 refugees are viewed as traitors to the cause. Purist
democracy activists assert that legal recognition corrupts
the political movement, because Japanese officials can then
claim that obtaining refugee status is only a strategy to
remain in the country, rather than a critical way to protest
the ruling regime. Legal status, then, is perceived of as a
rejection of political transnationalism. Because so much
political advocacy takes place in local communities, this
dynamic plays a significant role in reducing the transna-
tional actions of legal refugees.40
Asylum Seekers (Category 2)
Despite the fact that they are in danger of being picked up
by police, category 2 asylum seekers are the most active
politically, attending demonstrations and protesting at the
Burmese embassy almost daily (if they are not in detention,
in which  case their spouses are likely to be  involved in
protests). This is so for two reasons. First, asylum seekers
believe that their cases will be substantiated more easily if
they can prove political involvement in Japan, lawyers’ as-
surances to the contrary notwithstanding. The mispercep-
tion that transnational political action enhances the
likelihood of legal recognition is widespread in the Burmese
refugee community and clearly complicates refugees’ deci-
sions about political activism.
Second, those who choose to seek asylum are often at
greater risk for being arrested. Some have had, or fear, a
run-in with the police. Others try to obtain refugee status
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immediately upon arriving in Japan. Either way, they are
the most apprehensive about their current circumstances,
and require the most support from their local community.
Because community connections are reliant on putting in
“face time” at demonstrations and local political meetings,
category 2 refugees not only attend gatherings of all kinds,
but help with the tedium involved in running them. Ever
in danger of being caught by the police and less likely to be
securely  placed in a long-term  job,  it is  the category  2
refugees, not the majority of illegal overstayers, who are the
most vulnerable in Japan. They are the most intermediate
of an already intermediate-term population.
The intricacies of the Burmese refugee community are not
unique to Japan, but the divisions created by the provision of
preciously guarded legal status aggravate the three-way rela-
tionship already described. While many assume that legal
status improves the ability of refugees to engage in political
and social transformation, the provision of legal status can
have the opposite effect, weakening fragile community struc-
tures, stemming advocacy efforts, and discouraging commu-
nication between divided political and ethnic groups. Thus,
transnationalism, rather than acting as a simple function of
legal status (Figure 1), is more likely to be defined by the
interactions described in Figure 2.
Conclusion
The crafting of new democracies often demands patience and
reconciliation, rather than revenge or an arbitrary ‘settling of
accounts.’ It also requires courageous leadership on the part
of both outgoing authoritarian regimes and their democratic
opposition, and a broad understanding among supporters of
democracy that not everything can be achieved quickly. Di-
asporic forces that push for immediate results at the expense
of long-term political healing and viability may therefore
compromise or endanger the political ‘progress’ they seek to
encourage. This is particularly pertinent to the case of exiles
whose personal experiences of war and injustice prior to their
departure, and their commitment to continue the struggle
while abroad, have left them frozen in time.41
While Burma’s refugee population has the ability and
potential to engage in helpful and positive transnational
action, communication and co-operation on the local com-
munity level are critical. In this paper, I have suggested that
transnational potential – both positive and negative – stems
from both legal status and local community dynamics. In
attempting to generate new spaces (ideas and possibilities
for regime change) in old places (the home country), an
understanding of this three-way relationship will, it is
hoped, contribute to the discussion on transnationalism.
Legal recognition does provide important benefits to refu-
gee populations, but a better understanding of its divisive
effects on refugee communities will help the international
refugee regime to focus on the gaps that remain in its wake.
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